Research
Peer-Reviewed Articles
“Oligarchic Networks of Influence and Legislatures in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Ukraine.” Conditionally accepted at American Political Science Review (pending journal replication review). [Preprint]
Abstract
State capture by extremely wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop a network-based approach to studying captured institutions. Focusing on the national legislature and using social network and regression analyses of unique quantitative data and original interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2022), I demonstrate that oligarchs seek to defend their wealth by promoting as legislators individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. The connections between oligarchs and legislators take the form of a highly fragmented, weakly connected, and decentralized network with distinct clusters, where oligarchs occupy central positions, and influence the adoption of policies related to oligarchs' economic interests. The study has important implications for the scholarship on money in politics, oligarchy, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation.“Why the Difference? Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk After Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution,” Europe-Asia Studies, 2021, 73:10, 1832-1856. [Publisher Link] [Media Coverage]
Abstract
The pro-Russian protests that spread across the east and south of Ukraine in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution set largely similar regions on starkly different trajectories. While Donbas saw a successful rebellion and later slid into war, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk managed to avoid a separatist scenario. In this article, I examine the critical early stages of the pro-Russian unrest and argue that the initial success of the separatist rebellion in Donbas and its failure in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk can be best explained by the differences in elite strategies and civil society organisation in the respective regions.Book Project
“Divide and Rule: Oligarchic Networks and Patronal Politics.”
Working Papers & Work in Progress
“War, Oligarchs, and the Conditional Legitimacy of Property Rights.” Working paper. [Pre-Analysis Plan]
Abstract
Does war increase public support for state intervention in asset ownership, and under what conditions do citizens view wartime state infringements on the property rights of the extremely rich as legitimate? This paper develops and tests a theory of conditional property rights legitimacy under wartime conditions. Drawing on data from a multi-wave panel survey fielded in Ukraine before and after the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion, combined with an original conjoint survey experiment conducted during the full-scale war, I show that public support for state intervention in the ownership of industrial enterprises increases during wartime. However, support for nationalization is highly conditional on the behavior of individual extremely rich asset holders. Both pre-war and wartime actions by oligarchs—particularly those signaling prosociality, merit, and in-group belonging—reduce support for nationalization. The study contributes to scholarship on the political legitimacy of property rights, deservingness in evaluations of the rich, and war and redistribution.“Oligarchs and Geopolitical Realignment.”
Abstract
How do powerful economic elites and their political networks respond to geopolitical shocks? This paper leverages Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine in a before-and-after design that follows the same individuals over time and combines unique relational, expert, and administrative data to examine whether oligarchic networks of influence in the Ukrainian legislature endure and how oligarch-MPs and oligarchs' loyal legislators change their political behavior under extreme disruption. I find some network shrinkage, as some legislators exit parliament, but substantial behavioral adaptation—both oligarch-MPs and oligarchs' loyalists become significantly more likely to support pro-EU integration legislation after the full-scale invasion, while legislators outside oligarchic networks show little comparable shift. The paper evaluates three potential explanations for this realignment: wartime state centralization, the material weakening of oligarchs, and oligarchs' pre-war economic and political exposure to Russia.“Oligarchs as Networked Actors: A Relational Conceptualization in Comparative and Global Perspective,” with John Heathershaw (Exeter).
“How Do Attitudes towards Wealth and Economic Redistribution Vary across East European Democracies?,” with Bilyana Petrova (Texas Tech).