Research
Publications
Books and Monographs
Revolution and Reform in Ukraine: Evaluating Four Years of Reform, with Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson, PONARS Eurasia, July 2018. 70 pages. [Publisher Link]
Summary
In this volume, we assess the progress of reforms that Ukraine embarked on after its 2014 revolution and analyze the main factors that explain the successes and failures we see. We focus on a number of key areas—economic reform, governance and anti-corruption, security and criminal justice and language policy—and discuss the progress and challenges in each. The key to understanding patterns of relative success and failure, we argue, lies in understanding the interaction between Ukrainian civil society and the international community. We develop the idea of the "sandwich model" in which domestic civil society plays a crucial role in elaborating policy ideas and in policing progress in implementation, while the international community presses an often reluctant political elite into adopting reforms. The most progress in reforms has been made where cooperation between domestic civil society and international actors has been close and well-coordinated. In other areas, progress has been more limited. The "sandwich model" represents a new way of understanding how international and domestic actors can contribute to reform in a context where neither the government nor the opposition are unambiguously supportive of essential reforms.Peer-Reviewed Articles
“Oligarchic Networks of Influence and Legislatures in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Ukraine.” Conditionally accepted at American Political Science Review. [Preprint]
Abstract
State capture by extremely wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop a network-based approach to studying captured institutions. Focusing on the national legislature and using social network and regression analyses of unique quantitative data and original interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2022), I demonstrate that oligarchs seek to defend their wealth by promoting as legislators individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. The connections between oligarchs and legislators take the form of a highly fragmented, weakly connected, and decentralized network with distinct clusters, where oligarchs occupy central positions, and influence the adoption of policies related to oligarchs' economic interests. The study has important implications for the scholarship on money in politics, oligarchy, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation.“Why the Difference? Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk After Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution,” Europe-Asia Studies, 2021, 73:10, 1832-1856. [Publisher Link] [Media Coverage]
Abstract
The pro-Russian protests that spread across the east and south of Ukraine in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution set largely similar regions on starkly different trajectories. While Donbas saw a successful rebellion and later slid into war, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk managed to avoid a separatist scenario. In this article, I examine the critical early stages of the pro-Russian unrest and argue that the initial success of the separatist rebellion in Donbas and its failure in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk can be best explained by the differences in elite strategies and civil society organisation in the respective regions.Book Project
“Divide and Rule: Oligarchic Networks and Patronal Politics.” Book manuscript in progress.
Working Papers & Work in Progress
“War, Oligarchs, and the Conditional Legitimacy of Property Rights.” Working paper. [Pre-Analysis Plan]
Abstract
Does war increase public support for state intervention in asset ownership, and under what conditions do citizens view wartime infringements on property rights by the state as legitimate? Drawing on insights from the literatures on the political legitimacy of property rights, deservingness in evaluations of the rich, and war and redistributive preferences, this paper develops a theory of conditional property rights legitimacy during wartime. Property rights are politically sustained institutions shaped by social norms and context. I argue that war activates norms of solidarity and fairness regarding the distribution of the war burden, increasing public support for state intervention in asset ownership. However, this shift is not unconditional. Citizens evaluate the wartime contributions of wealthy asset holders, specifically the extremely rich (oligarchs), against standards of solidarity and fairness, while also taking into account these actors’ pre-war conduct, including how they made their wealth and the extent to which they contributed to society. When either of these criteria is not met, support for nationalization increases. I test this theory using multi-wave panel survey data from Ukraine fielded before and after the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion, combined with an original conjoint survey experiment conducted during the full-scale war. The results show that war increases public support for state intervention in the ownership of industrial enterprises. At the same time, support for nationalization is highly conditional on the behavior of individual extremely rich asset holders. Both pre-war and wartime actions by oligarchs—particularly those signaling prosociality, merit, and in-group belonging—reduce support for nationalization. However, no single form of prosocial wartime behavior offsets the positive effect of wealth acquired through corrupt or illegal means. This penalty can be mitigated or reversed only through a combination of prosocial behaviors.“Oligarchs and Geopolitical Realignment.” Work in progress.
Abstract
How do powerful economic elites respond to geopolitical shocks, and why do they support or resist foreign policy realignment? Focusing on Ukraine and leveraging Russia's 2014 limited invasion and its 2022 full-scale invasion as exogenous shocks, this paper examines shifts in oligarchs' political support for Euro-Atlantic integration. Drawing on comprehensive administrative and expert data, as well as original relational data identifying oligarchs' loyal legislators in parliament, I infer these shifts through the observable legislative behavior of oligarchs when they hold office, and that of their loyal legislators. I argue that variation in responses to the 2014 limited invasion is explained by oligarchs' pre-war economic exposure to Russia, while responses to the 2022 full-scale invasion are more uniform. Specifically, oligarchs with deeper economic exposure are more likely to resist Euro-Atlantic alignment than those with limited exposure.Oligarchs as Networked Actors: A Relational Conceptualization in Comparative and Global Perspective,” with John Heathershaw. Early work in progress.
“How Do Attitudes towards Wealth and Economic Redistribution Vary across East European Democracies?,” with Bilyana Petrova. Early work in progress.